



## MMC Latin America and the Caribbean

## QUARTER 4 2022



# Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: Latin America and the Caribbean

This Quarterly Mixed Migration Update (QMMU) covers the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region. The core countries of focus for this region are the countries currently affected by the Venezuelan crisis and the Caribbean islands. This QMMU covers Mexico and Central American countries concerning northern movements to the United States. Depending on the quarterly trends and migration-related updates, more attention may be given to some countries over the rest.

The QMMUs offer a quarterly update on new trends and dynamics related to mixed migration and relevant policy developments in the region. These updates are based on a compilation of a wide range of secondary (data) sources, brought together within a regional framework and applying a mixed migration analytical lens. Similar QMMUs are available for all MMC regions.

MMC is a global network engaged in data collection, research, analysis, and policy and programmatic development on mixed migration, with regional hubs hosted in Danish Refugee Council (DRC) regional offices in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Latin America, and a global team based across Geneva and Brussels. For more information on MMC, the QMMUs from other regions and contact details of regional MMC teams, visit [mixedmigration.org](http://mixedmigration.org) and follow us at [@Mixed\\_Migration](https://twitter.com/Mixed_Migration)

### **MMC's understanding of mixed migration**

“Mixed migration” refers to cross-border movements of people, including refugees fleeing persecution and conflict, victims of trafficking, and people seeking better lives and opportunities. Motivated to move by a multiplicity of factors, people engaged in mixed migration have a range of legal statuses as well as a variety of vulnerabilities. Although entitled to protection under international human rights law, they are exposed to multiple rights violations along their journey. Mixed migration describes refugees and migrants traveling along similar routes, using similar means of travel – often traveling irregularly, and wholly or partially, assisted by migrant smugglers.

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Juan Carlos Tomasi/MSF/February 2018

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# Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: Latin America and the Caribbean

Quarter 4 - 2022



## Key Updates

- According to the latest update of the Interagency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants of Venezuela (R4V), as of December 2022, [7,131,435](#) Venezuelans have left the country. Of these, [5,986,946](#) (84%) are in Latin American and Caribbean countries.
- Actors at the borders continue to report [return movements](#) to Venezuela. Among the [factors of Venezuelans leaving their host countries and their motivations to return](#), are the improved economic opportunities in the country, the difficulties settling in their host countries, and the desire to meet with family and friends.
- Since January 5, Cuban, Nicaraguan, and Haitian citizens are under a [new legal pathway](#) to enter the United States. Its parole process mirrors an existing program for Venezuelans announced in October. About, [30,000 people](#) will be able to apply to this program each month.
- After the [tightening of the policies](#) of entry to the United States for Venezuelan citizens, the number of Venezuelans trying to reach Panama from Colombia decreased by [98%](#) between October and November 2022, meanwhile, local actors in the field reported an increase in the transit of [Haitians and Ecuadorians](#) through the Darien Gap.
- Between October and December 2022, [717,660 “encounters”](#) were reported at the southern border of the United States. This represents an increase of 46% in comparison with the same period in 2021 (518,935 “encounters”). In December 2022, 251,487 “encounters” were registered.
- On December 27, the Supreme Court [ordered Title 42 border restrictions to remain in effect](#) until the Court reviews the matter in 2023. Between March 2020, when the measure was put in place, and December 2022, [more than 2 million refugees and migrants](#) have been expelled to Mexico under this policy.
- [Deaths or disappearances of refugees and migrants](#) on migratory routes are increasing across the Americas. More than [6,000 deaths](#) during migration have been documented between 2014 and 2022, according to the [IOM](#). Most lives have been lost trying to reach the United States, by land and seas. At the [Bolivian-Chilean borders](#), other deaths have also been reported.

## Regional Overview\*



## The Caribbean



\*Information on the map relates to selected updates and does not represent all mixed migration within and out of Latin America and the Caribbean.

# Mixed Migration Regional Updates

## Venezuelan Mixed Migration

### Movements towards South America

According to the latest update of the Interagency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants of Venezuela (R4V), as of December 2022, [7,131,435](#) Venezuelans have left the country. Of these, [5,986,946](#) (84%) are in Latin American and Caribbean countries. Colombia continues to be the main host country for Venezuelan refugees and migrants in the region ([41%](#) live in the country), followed by Peru ([25%](#)), Ecuador ([8%](#)), Chile ([7%](#)), and Brazil ([6%](#)).

Between January and November 2022, Uruguay received more than [9,000 Venezuelans](#). Local actors report that the country has become more attractive for Venezuelan refugees and migrants in recent months. According to them, the [economic downturn in neighbouring countries such as Argentina](#) may explain the bounce of migratory movements to Uruguay.

Although [departures from Venezuela](#) remain significant, [a growing number of Venezuelans](#) established in countries of the region are reporting their intention to return to Venezuela. According to [UNHCR and Plan International](#)'s border monitoring in Tumbes (at the border between Peru and Ecuador), [59%](#) of the families interviewed in November intended to return to Venezuela.

A [study](#) produced by the [Mixed Migration Centre](#) through its [4Mi data collection initiative](#) indicates that [people who return to Venezuela](#) appear to be undertaking return journeys with mixed motivations. [45%](#) of all 4Mi respondents in Desaguadero (Peru), Bogota, and Cucuta (Colombia) report returning due to [the apparent economic improvement of the country](#), and are driven by difficulties settling in the host countries of the region (71% of all surveyed refugees and migrants). Respondents also report returning due to the wish to reunite with family and friends (81%).

Refugees and migrants returning to Venezuela are aware that the situation in the country [remains unstable](#), and [expect to face some critical challenges](#). [Only a minority expect to stay permanently](#) in Venezuela. According to local actors in Venezuela, a considerable proportion of returnees may decide to [migrate again](#) to different host countries in the region, Colombia being the most attractive destination in the region.

### Migration and regularization process in Colombia

According to Migration Colombia, as of December 2022, [2,477,588](#) Venezuelan refugees and migrants were in the country.

As of January 2023, [1,646,892](#) Temporary Protection Permits (PPTs) were printed and [1,589,986](#) PPTs were delivered. Colombian authorities informed that [in the first months of 2023, massive deliveries of PPTs will be made](#) in Cucuta, Medellín, Cartagena, and other cities in the country.

The PPTs have contributed to the guarantee of access to rights in Colombia. However, civil society actors advocate that more [concrete actions](#) aimed at improving the socioeconomic integration of the Venezuelan population in the country are still needed. REACH's "[Multisectoral Needs Analysis](#)" shows evidence that [48%](#) of Venezuelan households surveyed in Colombia have intersectoral needs unmet, in the sectors of livelihoods, nutritional health, and access to healthcare, among others.

In December, the Colombian Foreign Ministry, and the Interagency Group on Mixed Migration Flows (GIFMM) presented the "[Colombia Chapter](#)" of the Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan 2023-2024 (RMRP). The document outlines a set of actions aimed at responding to [the needs of the refugee and migrant population in the country and projects the necessary resources](#) to assist that population.

According to the Minister of Commerce, Industry, and Tourism of Colombia, [binational commerce grew more than 80% since the full restoration of diplomatic relations and the reopening of the border between Colombia and Venezuela](#). On January 1, 2023, the authorities of Colombia and Venezuela, [reopened the border crossing at the international bridge "Atanasio Girardot"](#) which had been closed since 2016, located in Villa de Rosario (Norte de Santander).

## Peru

After Colombia, Peru is the second country receiving Venezuelan refugees and migrants. As of December 2022, more than [1.4 million](#) Venezuelans live there.

Since early December, the country has been experiencing a political and social crisis following the [impeachment of former President Pedro Castillo](#) and the subsequent [establishment of a new national authority](#), leading to a series of protests across the country.

National authorities declared a "[state of emergency](#)" on December 14, due to the increase in violence during demonstrations that have left at least [60 people dead](#). The measure [was extended](#) for 30 days since January 16.

[Blockades on national highways](#) and other public roads have affected [people's transit](#), especially in the south of the country at the border with Bolivia, where there have been [constant blockades](#) of the roads linking the two countries, and restrictions on the [sale of transportation tickets](#).

[Local actors](#) in Peru continue to raise awareness about the barriers to access to rights faced by [Venezuelans fined](#) by the country's migratory entity. In November, the [Peruvian Ombudsman's Office](#) requested protection [against the applicability of administrative fines](#) to foreigners, judging them as [disproportionate and contrary to fundamental rights](#).

The bill that considered a [migratory amnesty](#) to exempt the payment of administrative fines for foreigners was [rejected by the National Defense Commission on November 21](#). The amnesty proposal was presented in August 2022, after over [100,000 foreigners, mostly Venezuelans](#), were fined by the National Migration System.

Peruvian authorities have tightened migration controls throughout the national territory. Between [October](#) and [November](#), more than 2,000 foreigners were apprehended by the authorities for entering the country [irregularly, exceeding the time of stay, and/or not complying with an order of departing the Peruvian territory](#).

## Brazil

As of December 2022, there were [358,120](#) Venezuelan migrants and refugees in Brazil. In November 2022, 14,692 Venezuelans entered Brazil, according to the [Observatory of International Migration \(OBMigra\)](#).

Between 2021 and 2022, Venezuelan asylum applications decreased by [42%](#), from 4,439 between January and November 2021, to 2,555 between January and November 2022. Approximately [47%](#) of the refugee applications filed during the month of November 2022 were made in [Pacaraima](#), Roraima state, near the border with Venezuela.

[Over 23,000 Venezuelan refugees and migrants](#) benefited from an ["internalization"](#) strategy between January and October 2022. This strategy supports the socioeconomic integration of the Venezuelan population through relocation in several cities across the country. [89,645](#) Venezuelans have been assisted through this strategy.

[Humanitarian actors in the field](#) point out the difficulties indigenous people face to access healthcare in Paracaima, Roraima state, mainly because of a lack of documentation. According to [R4V](#), as of July 2022, Brazil hosts about [8,118](#) people belonging to Venezuelan indigenous communities.

On January 5, 2023, the current government of Brazil [announced its return](#) to the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration. In 2019, former President Jair Bolsonaro [decided to withdraw](#) the country from this agreement.

## Ecuador

As of December 2022, about [8%](#) of Venezuelan refugees and migrants in the region were in Ecuador.

According to the Ministry of the Interior, as of December 2022, [92,185 people on the move](#) had completed their ["immigration registration"](#) through the official platform "[I am here](#)". The process of [regularization](#) began on September 1, 2022, following the [Decree 436](#) of June 2022, which contemplates migratory amnesty and extraordinary regularization of Venezuelans with regular entry to the territory.

[Venezuelans with irregular entry](#) to Ecuadorian territory will be included in the "migratory amnesty" from [February 2023](#).

The regularization is given through the [Temporary Residence Visa of Exception](#) for Venezuelan Citizens (VIRTE), which is valid for 2 years and can only be renewed once. According to data from the [Ecuadorian Foreign Ministry](#), as of December 21, 2022, [30,193 temporary residence visas](#) were issued.

Since November 16, 2022, [foreign citizens of other nationalities](#) who have entered Ecuador regularly were also allowed to register and benefit from this regularization process.

In November, the Ministry of Economic and Social Inclusion (MIES) presented the “[Protocol of comprehensive care for non-national children and adolescents on the move](#).” This document provides guidelines for the [attention, regularization, and protection](#) of children in mobility conditions transiting through the country.

## Chile

According to R4V, [444,423](#) Venezuelan refugees and migrants were in Chile in December 2022.

Between April and December 2022, [1,745](#) deportation referrals have been sent to the Investigation Police (PDI); of these, [792](#) deportations were made.

The Chilean Senate continues its efforts to facilitate the deportation of foreigners. Specifically, the Senate is considering adding alternatives [for deportation announcements](#), such as by [email and certified letters](#), to foreign people with administrative processes for deportation who have a criminal record or irregular entry into the country. This request is part of the [bill](#) submitted by the Ministry of Interior, in August 2022.

Security conditions in the northern regions, bordering Bolivia and Peru, continue to deteriorate. According to the [Center for Crime Studies and Analysis](#), in the third quarter of 2022 the regions of Arica, Parinacota, Tarapacá, and Antofagasta, had the [highest crime rates in the country](#).

Insecurity in the country is threatening the coexistence between the refugee and migrant population and the host communities in the country. A [public opinion study](#) conducted in 16 regions found that [31%](#) of respondents perceived a relationship between the [growth of migration and the increase in crime rates](#) in Chile. [Local authorities](#) in the northern regions insist on the need to restore the State of Exception, which was applied between February and April 2022, due to [the presence of criminal gangs operating in the border region](#).

Refugees and migrants crossing the Chilean border with Bolivia through [unauthorized crossings](#) face death hazards due to the [extreme environmental conditions of the area \(high mountains, extreme cold\)](#). According to the “[Exploratory report: migrant deaths on the Chilean border](#)”, between 2016 and November 2022, 42 foreigners died in their attempt to enter the territory. [60%](#) of the deaths occurred in [Colchane](#), the border crossing between Chile and Bolivia. [39%](#) were Venezuelans.

## Movements towards North America

On October 12th, the United States government announced the implementation of a [new process](#) for regular entry to the country of Venezuelan citizens. [To be eligible](#), Venezuelans are required to meet [strict requirements](#), such as having a sponsor to finance their stay and not having irregularly entered Mexico or Panama (for more information, [see pages 13 and 14](#)).

Immediately after the announcement, the number of Venezuelans migrating from South America to the north declined. In October 2022, the [Panamanian National Migration Service](#) registered [40,593](#) entries of Venezuelans to its territory from the Darien Gap, and [668](#) in November (-98%). Venezuelan entries in Panama increased slightly in December (1,374 entries) following [a federal judge's decision to end Title 42](#) on December 21, 2022.

In December, the [U.S. Customs and Border Protection \(CBP\)](#) reported [8,130](#) "encounters" with Venezuelans at the southern border, a decrease of 63% compared to October 2022 ([22,045](#) "encounters").

Given the impossibility of regularly entering the United States, a considerable proportion of Venezuelans who were already in Central American countries decided [to return to Venezuela](#) through humanitarian flights provided by Venezuelan authorities from [Panama](#), [Guatemala](#), and [Mexico](#).

Despite the recent changes in migratory regulations, people on the move, mostly Venezuelans, still try to reach Central America by sea from South America, facing risks of shipwrecks and death ([see QMMU Q3 2022](#)).

During the first week of October 2022, Colombian authorities [intercepted 131 people](#), mainly Venezuelan refugees, and migrants sailing to Nicaragua from the island of San Andrés (Colombia). In 2022, Colombian coastal authorities intercepted approximately [621](#) migrants in the waters of the San Andrés archipelago.

On December 17, about [26 people](#), mostly Venezuelans, disappeared between San Andrés and Corn Island, Nicaragua. According to the National Organization for Rescue and Maritime Security of Aquatic Spaces (ONSA), [the boat and some belongings](#) were found near Puerto Limón in Costa Rica, without any sign of the people who were on board.

Reports indicate a new maritime route between [México's Pacific coast and Guatemala](#). Recent [investigations](#) have revealed that the boats begin their journey in Ocós, a small town in northern Guatemala, to the coasts of Chiapas or Oaxaca (Mexico). In November, [authorities reported the shipwreck of a boat](#) near the coast of Chiapas. Minors were among those missing.

## Movements towards North America

### Panama

According to the [National Migration Service of Panama](#), between January and December 2022, [248,284](#) entries to Panama from the Darien Gap were reported. [77%](#) of entries correspond to people from South America (191,142), [12%](#) from the Antilles (30,861), [5%](#) from Asia (13,411), and [5%](#) from Africa (11,654).

[UNICEF](#) estimates that the number of children and adolescents travelling through the Darien Gap reached an [all-time high in 2022](#). Between January and October, over [32,000](#) children crossed this dangerous route. Half of the children on the move registered in Panama were [under 5 years old](#).

## Costa Rica

Costa Rica received [75,787](#) refugee applications from January to October 2022. Among these, [92%](#) (69,891 applications) correspond to Nicaraguans and [3%](#) (2,175 applications) to Venezuelan citizens, among other nationalities. Currently, more than [200,000 asylum applications are pending](#) in the country.

A considerable number of refugees and migrants are [stranded](#) in Costa Rica, without economic resources to continue their journey, following the change in the immigration rules for the entry of Venezuelan citizens to the United States.

Local actors have reported that in several cities of the country, a substantial number of people on the move [stay in shelters provided by local organizations or in makeshift camps in public spaces](#).

Considering the increase in asylum applications, in November, the government of Costa Rica [announced the modification of the provisions associated with granting refugee status in the country](#). Under a [new regulation](#), work permits for asylum seekers will no longer be granted immediately. Additionally, only in-person applications will be accepted, and leaving the country during the process is also restricted.

Another recent decree, signed in November, contemplates the creation of a [Special Temporary Category for nationals of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela](#), whose refugee applications are pending or were denied. Applicants should have submitted their refugee application after January 2010 and by September 30, 2022.

Citizens of these three nationalities will be able to obtain temporary permits for up to two years. This decree will be effective on [March 1, 2023](#).

The new regulations to access asylum have increased the number of [asylum seekers waiting outside immigration offices](#) to get an appointment to attend their cases. On January 20, 2023, the immigration authorities announced the [permanent presence of police officers in the offices of the refugee unit to prevent illegal acts by persons offering irregular migratory services](#).

## Guatemala

Guatemala continues to strengthen [immigration controls](#) throughout its territory. Between September and November 2022, migration authorities expelled more than [10,370](#) people to the southern border with Honduras.

[65%](#) of those expulsions correspond to Venezuelans, and [12%](#) to Ecuadorians, among other nationalities. According to Guatemalan authorities, between October and November 2022, [743](#) Venezuelans who were stranded in the country voluntarily returned to Venezuela.

From January to November 2022, [88,287](#) Guatemalans were returned, deported, or voluntarily returned by plane from the United States ([43%](#)) and Mexico ([16%](#)), meanwhile, [36,108](#) Guatemalan citizens reentered the country by land, according to the Returnee Reception Center in Tecún Umán.

## Honduras

Honduran authorities registered [78,433](#) irregular entries to their territory, between October and December 2022. Of these, [28%](#) correspond to Cuban citizens, followed by [25%](#) of Venezuelans, among other nationalities such as Ecuadorians, Haitians, and Colombians.

During this period, [73%](#) of people who entered Honduras were identified at the border points of Danlí and Trojes, in the south of the country, near the border with Nicaragua. [Registration of irregular entries](#) corresponds to people who requested a transit permit to continue their trip in the country.

[Humanitarian actors](#) in the field support the improvement of [infrastructure and assistance services in Danlí and Trojes due to the](#) increase of mixed movements and the growing [need for humanitarian assistance](#).

In Tegucigalpa (the capital of the country), [religious organizations](#) have set up [temporary shelters](#) for people in transit or [without resources](#) to continue the journey.

According to [local actors](#), refugees and migrants transiting through Honduras are victims of [abuses and violations](#). At least [16 cases of migrant deaths](#) were investigated by the Honduran Public Ministry in 2022.

An [independent investigation](#) found that the main causes of death for people transiting the country were homicides, traffic accidents, and drowning. Likewise, the report mentions that refugees and migrants are exposed to a considerable risk of [theft, intimidation, and threats during transit through Honduras](#).

On November 23, the Honduran government approved [the extension of the "migratory amnesty"](#) until June 1, 2023. This measure exempts people who enter Honduras, through irregular pathways, from paying fines. It should be recalled that the migratory amnesty was [first implemented in August 2022](#), to address the increase in mixed movements across the country.

Between January and December 2022, [94,339](#) Hondurans were returned, deported, or returned voluntarily to the country. Of these, [96%](#) came from Mexico and the United States ([90,990](#) people). This figure represents an increase of [28%](#) compared to the same period in 2021 ([73,967](#) people).

## Mixed migration in Mexico

In 2022, Mexico received [118,478 refugee applications](#), from Honduras ([26%](#)), Cuba ([15%](#)), Haiti ([14%](#)), and Venezuela ([13%](#)). In 2022, asylum seekers' applications decreased by [9%](#) compared to 2021 ([129,791](#) applications).

As of December 2022, Tapachula (in the south of the country) is the city with the largest number of applicants ([76,239 persons](#)), followed by Mexico City ([17,364 applicants](#)).

Following the implementation of the new immigration process for the entry of the Venezuelan population into the United States, [temporary shelters were arranged by local authorities in Tijuana, Sonora, and other cities in northern Mexico](#), to receive Venezuelans expelled under that measure.

The poor reception capacity in the shelters and the increase in mixed movements after the announcement of a [possible end of Title 42](#), led to informal [camps](#) also being set up in [Matamoros](#), [Ciudad Juárez](#), [Reynosa](#), and other northern cities. Although [some camps have been dismantled](#), it is estimated that over [10,000 people](#) remain in informal settlements throughout the US border.

In December, the National Migration Institute (INM) announced the [closure](#) of the transitional migrant camp located in the municipality of San Pedro Tapanatepec, Oaxaca. Due to the saturation of services in Tapachula, Chiapas, immigration procedures were [temporarily transferred](#) to this municipality in July 2022.

Faced with the withdrawal of immigration services, [local authorities of San Pedro Tapanatepec](#) urged people in transit to [move](#) outside the town. In parallel, they plan to set up [brigades to remove tents and unauthorized camps](#) in the city's public areas.

Mexican authorities are increasing border controls in the northern part of the country, starting with the operation "[Contención Juárez-El Paso](#)" which attempts to discourage irregular crossings to the United States. The increase in border controls [coincides](#) with the announcement of the new entry measures to the United States for several nationalities, announced on January 5, 2023.

## Migrant caravans to the United States

On November 9, 2022, around [600](#) people left Tapachula in a caravan to Huixtla, due to the impossibility of obtaining documents for transit through the country.

At the beginning of December, a caravan with more than [1,000 people](#) arrived in Jiménez, Chihuahua, from Mapimí, Durango. The group of people was heading to Ciudad Juárez. However, they were [stopped and then transported to shelters](#) until December 11 when authorities [transported them by bus to Ciudad Juarez](#).

On December 18, a caravan of [Mexicans coming from the United States](#) was attacked by an armed group in Zacatecas. Towards the end of the December holiday period, the [National Guard of Mexico](#) reinforced "[security and support actions](#)" to protect Mexicans residing in the United States and transiting through the territory.

## The situation on the border with the United States

### Encounters

In December 2022, there were [251,487](#) "encounters" at the southern border of the United States, an increase of [7%](#) compared to the month of November (234,896 total "encounters"). [64%](#) of the "encounters" of the month of December correspond to single adults and [31%](#) to family unit individuals.

[12,298](#) unaccompanied minors were registered by The Department of Customs and Border Protection (USCBP) in December, with an average of [570](#) children or adolescents in their custody per day. Compared to November 2022, it represents a decrease of [6%](#) (13,136 "encounters").

According to [UNICEF](#) and the [Migration Policy Institute \(MPI\)](#), children or adolescents in custody by USCBP face challenges and negative experiences throughout the journey and [difficulties in integrating into communities once they were reunited with their families](#).

## Expulsions and deportations

In December, [49,405](#) people ([20%](#) of all totals “encounters”) were expelled from the United States at the southern border under Title 42, while [202,082](#) people were processed under Title 8.

## Changes in United States Policy

### The new migration process for Venezuelans, Cubans, Nicaraguans, and Haitians

On October 12, 2022, the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), announced the implementation of a [new immigration control process for Venezuelans](#) to “[create a more orderly and secure process](#)” and “[reduce irregular migration](#)”.

The “[parole process for Venezuelans](#)”, effective immediately upon its announcement, included a [regular entry mechanism](#) for up to [24,000 qualified Venezuelans](#). Venezuelan citizens are required to meet [strict requirements](#), such as having an economic sponsor with regular status in the country, not having been deported from the United States in the last five years, and not having entered Panama and Mexico irregularly.

According to [official figures](#), as of October 31, 2022, more than [6,000](#) Venezuelans had been authorized to enter the country after following the process of this measure. Citizens authorized would be able to apply for [temporary residence permits](#) valid for up to two years, which allows them to work and access social security during the validity of the document.

On January 5, 2023, new rules for Cubans, Nicaraguans, and Haitians were announced by the DHS. This process is [modeled](#), which was launched in October 2022. This parole establishes [temporary status for individuals](#) with similar eligibility criteria and benefits of temporary stays to those applied to Venezuelan citizens.

This program is expected to benefit [30,000](#) people from Cuba, Nicaragua, and Haiti each month. Furthermore, the limit for Venezuelan citizens has also increased from [24,000 to 30,000](#) according to the DHS announcement.

Those from Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti, and Venezuela who attempt to enter the United States through irregular pathways may be [expelled to Mexico](#). However, [the acceptance of the expulsion](#) will depend on the Mexican authorities’ decision.

Following this announcement, on January 12, the DHS launched the [CBP ONE mobile application to facilitate anticipated travel documents authorization](#) to Cubans, Nicaraguans, Haitians, and Venezuelans whose financial sponsors in the United States have been approved under the new regulations applied to these nationalities.

[Migrants and asylum seekers](#) who are not eligible for the parole process or do not meet the requirements for entering the United States can use the CBP ONE APP to make an appointment with immigration officials to be granted an [exemption from quick expulsion through Title 42](#).

To be eligible, [people must meet at least one of the vulnerability criteria](#) included in the app such as physical illness, pregnancy, or having been threatened or harmed while in Mexico, among others.

According to migrants' rights activists, the CBP ONE app established [new barriers to accessing the country, due to the requirement to have a cellphone and an internet connection](#). People with limited [language skills or literacy skills](#) also face [difficulties in uploading their information](#) or even understanding how the app works.

The [high demand for appointments](#) has caused the [app to crash](#), leaving many people facing [constant waiting](#) or even accessing [scammers](#) who offer appointments, even though the process is free.

## Temporary Protected Status (TPS)

In December, the DHS confirmed the 18-month extension ([from February 4, 2023, to August 3, 2024](#)) of the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for [Haitian citizens](#). This measure responds to the extraordinary conditions that Haiti is going through. [Only Haitians](#) who resided in the United States before [November 6, 2022, may apply to the TPS](#).

## Other updates on Immigration Policies

Since March 2021, the state of Texas has implemented a border control program called "[Operation Lone Star](#)". Under this program, between April and December 2022, Texas moved more than [15,000](#) migrants to Washington D.C., New York, and Chicago. Another [890](#) people have been moving to Philadelphia since November 15.

According to the statements of Texas authorities, the relocation and transportation of migrants to "[sanctuary cities](#)" has become a strategy "[that provides relief to communities in the face of the open borders policy](#)" of the Biden Administration.

In addition, in December, the Governor of Texas [requested an investigation into NGOs operating in the state](#), accusing them of promoting irregular migration to the territory. In an official [communication sent to the Attorney General of Texas](#), authorities allude that NGOs are helping to facilitate the unauthorized transportation of migrants across state borders.

It is also noted, "[that NGOs may be involved in illegally orchestrating other border crossings through activities on both sides of the border, including in sectors other than El Paso](#)". The U.S. Department of Justice is investigating the "Lone Star" program for "[potential human rights violations](#)".

## Extra-regional mixed migration movements

During 2022, [248,284](#) entries to Panama through the Darien Gap were registered. Around [9%](#) came from Haiti (22,435 people), [2%](#) from Cuba, (5,961), and, [2%](#) from India (4,094), among other extracontinental nationalities with fewer entries registered.

Between October 2021 and September 2022, the United States Coast Guard (USGC) intercepted [6,182](#) Cubans ([637% more than in 2021, 838 interceptions](#)). Since the beginning of the fiscal year 2023, [4,795](#) Cubans have been intercepted at sea, according to official reports.

The number of USGC interceptions of Haitians continues to grow. Since October 2022, [1,036](#) Haitians have been identified as attempting to enter the United States by sea.

[The maritime authorities of the Turks and Caicos Islands](#), south of the Bahamas, intercepted more than [300 Haitians](#) in territorial waters between December 23, 2022, and January 2, 2023. Of these, [184](#) have already been returned to their country. Another [34 people from Haiti](#) were rescued on Monito Island, Puerto Rico, after being allegedly abandoned by smugglers.

# Thematic focus:

## Title 42 - The Human Cost of an Expulsion Policy

In recent years, the United States has been adopting an increasingly restrictive approach to immigration and border control. As part of this approach, [several migration policies](#) were adopted to aim and outsource migration management through the expulsion of migrants or asylum seekers entering the United States from third countries.

The most recent example is the Title 42 policy, which was [implemented in March 2020](#) during the COVID-19 pandemic. This measure allows the [immediate expulsion](#) of any migrant or asylum seeker entering the US back to northern Mexico. This Title 42 policy was justified as part of the [effort to contain](#) the spreading of the COVID-19 virus at the beginning of the pandemic and has been extended ever since.

Despite Biden's administration's [expressed desire](#) to end this measure and the strong criticism by [human rights organizations](#) and [health experts](#), on December 27 [the Supreme Court](#) ordered to temporarily maintain this expulsion policy.

By November 2022, [more than 2 million people](#) have been sent back to Mexico, at [risk of suffering abuses and multiple violence](#) by [criminal actors](#) and [authorities](#).

### How has Title 42 been implemented?

Title 42 was implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak. The US Government [has justified its application as a public healthcare measure](#). The [title or clause 42](#) refers to the ["Public Health Services Law, of 1994"](#) and [allows authorities](#) to take exceptional public health actions in the face of a specific health crisis. US authorities rarely enforced this rule [before](#) March 2020.

[Border officials and immigration control patrols](#) implemented the policy immediately after its announcement, in March 2020, they started [immediately expelling](#) people attempting to enter the national territory.

From 2020 onwards, Title 42 applied to citizens of Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Mexico, who were sent back to Mexico [after an agreement with the Mexican authorities](#). In addition, Haitians who attempted to cross the US borders irregularly from Mexico were returned to Haiti on "[repatriation flights](#)." UNHRC said U.S. expulsions to such a volatile situation "[might violate international law and could constitute refoulement](#)".

Since May 2022, the Mexican government has [authorized](#) the reception of [Nicaraguan and Cuban citizens who have been expelled under Title 42](#). In October 2022, [expulsions were extended to Venezuelans](#).

## Claims to end or maintain Title 42

Several experts from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommend the [termination of Title 42](#) as of May 2022, arguing that there [was no justification to maintain](#) this policy for public health reasons. However, after a [coalition of 23 states](#), including Arizona, Louisiana, and Missouri, requested its continuation, a [federal judge blocked](#) the possibility of ending the policy.

On November 1, a federal judge in the District of Washington ruled that the Title 42 policy should [end on December 21](#), arguing that it was “[arbitrary and capricious](#)” and “[would likely expel migrants to locations with a ‘high probability’ of ‘persecution, torture, violent assaults, or rape’](#)”. In response to this decision, on December 19, [another coalition of 19 states](#) with a Republican majority asked the appeals court to delay the end of Title 42 border restrictions.

Finally, On December 27, [the Supreme Court ordered that Title 42 border restrictions remain in effect](#) until the Court reviews the matter by mid-2023.

After the announcement, the Biden administration issued a [statement](#) indicating that it was moving forward with the “[preparations to manage the border in a secure, orderly, and humane way when Title 42 eventually lifts](#)”, also adding that “[Title 42 is a public health measure, not an immigration enforcement measure, and it should not be extended indefinitely](#)”.

## Expulsion dynamics

### Profiles and nationalities

Title 42 applies to foreigners (single adults, individuals family units, or accompanied minors), who attempt to enter the United States. Since February 2021, unaccompanied minors have been exempted from removal under the policy, following an [order issued by the CDC](#) (see Table 1).

**Table 1. Profiles of people expelled by Title 42 between 2020 and 2023 (nationwide)**

Profiles	Fiscal Year				Total
	2020	2021	2022	2023*	
Single Adults	183,270	930,374	961,239	181,605	2,256,488
Individuals in family units	10,050	126,847	116,063	22,505	275,465
Accompanied minors	310	1,571	2,198	1,273	5,352
Unaccompanied minors	11,157	4,734	7	12	15,910
					<b>2,553,215</b>

Note: Graph made by MMC, with official data nationwide encounters from CBP

\*Figures for the fiscal year 2023, from October to December 2022

Between the fiscal year 2020 and fiscal year 2023, 88% of people processed under Title 42 were single adults, according to the nationwide data reported by US Customs and Border Protection (CBP).

**Table 2. Southern Border Encounters and percentage of persons processed Under Title 42**

Fiscal Year	Southern border “encounters”	Number of people expelled under Title 42 at the southern border	Percentage of Persons processed Under Title 42 vs Encounters in Southern Border
2020	458,088	204,787	45%
2021	1,734,686	1,063,526	61%
2022	2,378,944	1,079,507	45%
2023*	717,660	197,790	28%
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,289,378</b>	<b>2,545,610</b>	<b>48%</b>

Note: Graph made by MMC, with official data of southern border encounters from CBP

\* Figures for the fiscal year 2023, from October to December 2022

\*\* Figures include all profiles

Since 2020, deportation to Mexico under Title 42 was only applicable to people from [Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Mexico](#). In 2022, with the increase in migratory movements of other nationalities, this norm was extended to people from [Haiti, Nicaragua, Cuba](#), and [Venezuela](#) between October 2022 and January 2023.

**Graph 3. Nationalities vs expulsions under Title 42 in the Southern Border**

Nationalities	Fiscal Year				Total by Nationality
	2020	2021	2022	2023*	
El Salvador	5,943	56,759	56,309	8,325	127,336
Honduras	17,035	167,374	134,077	19,704	338,190
Guatemala	15,144	173,616	154,193	25,550	368,503
Mexico	157,882	582,537	692,363	119,616	1,552,398
Haiti	735	10,136	12,211	13	23,095
Nicaragua	370	3,291	4,148	194	8,003
Cuba	4,743	7,204	4,710	193	16,850
Venezuela	49	1,270	669	16,679	18,667

Note: Graph made by MMC, with data of southern border encounters from CBP

\* Figures for the fiscal year 2023, from October to December 2022

\*\* Figures include all profiles and the most representative nationalities

## Consequences and risks for expelled people on the move

According to a study by [Human Rights First](#), under Title 42, people have been expelled to some of Mexico's most dangerous cities, increasing their exposure to [threats](#) and abuses, including [physical and sexual violence, kidnapping, and theft](#), among others. Human Rights First has documented more than [13,000](#) reports of abuses committed in Mexico against asylum seekers and migrants expelled from the country.

Along with [safety risks](#), people are sent back to areas with [insufficient reception capacities](#). [Actors in the field](#) indicate that expelled people suffer from a lack of [livelihood opportunities, lack of access to healthcare services and food](#). Asylum seekers and migrants expelled to Mexico are facing an [administrative maze](#) and a [lack of information](#) about migration processes, leaving them with less chance of escaping the cycle of unsuccessful crossing attempts to the United States.

# Highlighted New Research and Reports



## [Latin America and the Caribbean in the Global Humanitarian Overview 2023](#)

### **United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs | December 2022**

The Global Humanitarian Outlook 2023 shows that the number of people in need in Latin America and the Caribbean will reach 29.2 million by 2023. Food insecurity, recurrent disasters exacerbated by climate change, displacement within and beyond borders, and chronic violence are humanitarian needs that can be interconnected, continue, and even worsen by 2023.



## [Mid-Year Trend Report 2022](#)

### **United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees | December 2022**


The 2022 mid-year trends, highlighted by UNHCR, show that 42% of new asylum applications worldwide were made by nationals of Latin America and the Caribbean, mostly from countries such as Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, Honduras, and Colombia. There is also evidence that the root causes of displacement (violence, conflict, insecurity, persecution, and human rights violations) persist in the region. These causes are often exacerbated by the effects of climate change.



## [Regional study: Our right to safety: Placing forcibly displaced women at the center of searching solutions to address gender-based violence](#)

### **United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees - HIAS | December 2022**

A regional study exposes the protection challenges and contributing factors that expose refugee women, in their diversity, to gender-based violence in seven Latin American countries: Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. It also identifies good practices for preventing, mitigating risk, and responding to gender-based violence, and recommends concrete actions to strengthen interventions that address the issue across the region.



MMC is a global network engaged in data collection, research, analysis, and policy and programmatic development on mixed migration, with regional hubs hosted in Danish Refugee Council regional offices in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Latin America, and a global team based across Geneva and Brussels.

MMC is a leading source for independent and high-quality data, research, analysis, and expertise. MMC aims to increase understanding of mixed migration, to positively impact global and regional migration policies, to inform evidence-based protection responses for people on the move and to stimulate forward thinking in public and policy debates on mixed migration. MMC's overarching focus is on human rights and protection for all people on the move.

MMC is part of the Danish Refugee Council (DRC).

For more information visit:  
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